Conditional Immortality—An Acceptable View?

What does Conditional Immortality affirm and deny?

As a Christian doctrinal position, conditional immortality affirms that immortality—living forever and never dying—is a gift from God given only to the saved (1 Tim 6:16; Rom 2:7; 2 Tim 1:10; 1 Cor 15:54; John 6:50-51; John 11:25-26; Luke 20:36).

It also tacitly rejects universal immortality, the view that all people either are or will be immortal. Since this is a tenet of both eternal torment and universal salvation, conditionalism necessarily denies those two positions.1

Conditional immortality, or conditionalism, is expressed in terms of a reward of “eternal life” for the saved, and an “eternal punishment” for the finally unsaved (Matt 25:46). The punishment is an “eternal judgment” of death instead of life, since the wages of sin is death (Heb 6:2; Rom 6:23). This requires an “eternal destruction” of “body and soul” (2 Thess 1:9 cf. Matt 10:28).

Although the biblical label for that event is “the second death,” it can also be called annihilation (conditionalism and annihilationism may be used interchangeably). Whereas the concept of death indicates the forfeit of life but doesn’t specify duration, annihilation speaks of a death that is a permanent loss of life, and destruction of the whole person. Since God is the source and sustainer of life (Acts 17:25; Heb 1:3; Rev 2:7 cf. Gen 3:22), this kind of demise may be considered a consequence of eternal separation or severance from God.

Proponents of conditionalism are therefore able to affirm any Christian statement of faith that includes the language of eternal separation, or expressly biblical terms such as “eternal punishment” and “eternal fire.” Examples of such statements are referenced below. However, conditionalists are unable to affirm statements which specify everlasting torment, or any kind of everlasting consciousness (immortality) for the unsaved.

Does Conditional Immortality reject a core doctrine of Christian faith?

Conditional Immortality does not reject any core doctrine of Christian faith, either directly or by implication. Conditionalism actually emphasizes some core doctrines, including bodily resurrection and the atoning death of Christ.

Neither conditionalism nor annihilationism were rejected by any early church councils or creeds. It is occasionally alleged that conditionalists deny the Athanasian Creed, where it says “and those who have done evil will enter eternal fire.” But conditionalists affirm this without reservation, believing that God’s eternal fire is what destroys those cast into it. The early creeds did not affirm universal immortality, either in the form of eternal torment or of universal salvation (a version of which was arguably rejected at the time of the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 AD).

However, eternal torment and the immortal soul became official dogma of the Roman Catholic church. If one is Catholic, then conditionalism might be considered a rejection of the church’s teaching. It also might not, in that some Catholic authors have recently argued for the legitimacy of conditionalism in their tradition.2

In the Protestant tradition, the papal dogma “that the soul is immortal” was most famously rejected by Martin Luther,3 and later by William Tyndale, both of whom were following in the footsteps of John Wycliffe in this regard. Protestants are not typically bound to any teaching that the soul is by nature immortal, and will thereby eternally exist. Strictly speaking, conditionalists need only deny that the soul will eternally exist, since even if God created a soul with an immortal constitution, God is still able to destroy it, and may do so.4

Conditionalism is sometimes charged with implying that the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ were separated,5 if he underwent the penalty that we say is due to sinners (under a penal substitutionary atonement model). But this is based on a mistaken assumption that conditionalism stipulates annihilation or everlasting destruction as the punishment for sin, instead of simply death (Rom 6:23). Death is always the wages of sin, and this applies at the final judgment, just as it did when Jesus forfeited or “laid down” his life (John 10:17, 18). Having died and atoned for sin, the sinless Christ rose from death, having victory over it. He had “abolished death and brought life and immortality to light” (2 Tim 1:10). The difference between the two occasions of the death penalty is not that the wages or punishment has changed, in which case an exact substitutionary atonement would not occur. Rather, in the context of final punishment a judgment of death is given that is eternally binding (Heb 6:2). Hence, the punishment for sin is then applied irrevocably. While it is true that annihilation or destruction ends up describing the event of eternal punishment, God still uses the judicial standard of death, the forfeit of life, rendered eternal.

So conditionalism does not deny any core doctrine of the Christian faith. Despite that, there are various contexts in which it may or may not be “acceptable.”

In which contexts is Conditional Immortality an acceptable view?

As noted, within the Catholic tradition where eternal torment is most dominant, the fact that conditionalism isn’t also acceptable is still not a settled matter. The Eastern Orthodox church has no official view (though it has a common view of hell), and is non-dogmatic in the area of eschatology.

In the Protestant world, conditionalism is broadly and generally permissible, if not outright affirmed (for instance, it is the official position of the Church of England6), although there are a variety of contexts which are the exception to this rule. These are usually tied to a statement of faith affirming eternal torment. While such statements exclude conditionalism from that particular context, they normally aren’t intended to pronounce that it is unacceptable everywhere. The general trend is toward statements with language deliberately selected to be inclusive of conditionalism and all forms of eternal torment, such as the Protestant Reforming Catholic Confession.

In terms of the global evangelical movement, conditionalism is compatible with the statement of faith of the World Evangelical Alliance, and other regional statements such as that of the Evangelical Alliance, the largest and oldest evangelical body in the UK, which also takes the position: “The interpretation of hell in terms of conditional immortality is a significant minority evangelical view. Furthermore, we believe that the traditionalist-conditionalist debate on hell should be regarded as a secondary rather than a primary issue for evangelical theology.”7

John Stott, a principal leader of the evangelical church, embraced conditionalism. Another principal leader, J.I. Packer, stated that conditionalists are “honored fellow-evangelicals,” and “it would be wrong for differences of opinion on this matter to lead to breaches of fellowship.”8 In conservative American circles, conditionalism is broadly permissible among laity wherever a statement of faith doesn’t preclude membership. Meanwhile, various church pastors (including Baptists, for example) and tenured academics have publicly declared their commitment to conditionalism.

Evangelical Conditionalism is seen as a distinctly acceptable form of conditional immortality, and is championed by the organisation, Rethinking Hell. Among the many celebrated proponents of evangelical conditionalism are Basil Atkinson, Richard Bauckham, E. Earle Ellis, Roger Forster, R.T. France, Michael Green, Harold Guillebaud, P.E. Hughes, David Instone-Brewer, Dale Moody, I. Howard Marshall, John Stackhouse Jr., John Stott, Richard Swinburne, Anthony Thistleton, Terrance Tiessen, Stephen Travis, John Wenham and Nigel Wright.


* * * * *

This article is also available in PDF format here, and may be freely distributed.

  1. Conditionalism therefore also rejects universal salvation’s stipulation of a universally-met condition for immortality. []
  2. See Paul J. Griffiths’ “Decreation: The Last Things of All Creatures” (Baylor University Press, 2014) and Robert Wild’s “A Catholic Reading Guide to Conditional Immortality: The Third Alternative to Hell and Universalism” (Resource Publications, 2016). []
  3. Martin Luther, “Assertio omnium Articulorum m. Lutheri per Bullam Leonis X. novissimam Damnatorum,” article 27, 131–32. Note: For Luther, the rejection of the soul’s innate immortality did not lead ultimately to rejecting eternal torment. []
  4. This nuance may allow full adherence to the Westminster Confession, which speaks of mankind being created “with reasonable and immortal souls,” if that is the view of the particular conditionalist. Otherwise, this confession is a notable exception, and cannot be affirmed. []
  5. For a more thorough response to this charge see Chris Date, “Cross Purposes: Atonement, Death and the Fate of the Wicked,” available in Part 1 and Part 2. []
  6. The Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, “The Mystery of Salvation” (London: Church House Publishing 1995). []
  7. Evangelical Alliance Commission on Unity and Truth among Evangelicals, “The Nature of Hell” (London: Paternoster Publishing 2005), see pp130-5. []
  8. J. I. Packer, “Evangelical Annihilationism in Review,” Reformation & Revival 6, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 37-51. []
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30 Responses to Conditional Immortality—An Acceptable View?

  1. Mark says:

    Thanks for this well written post. Like many others, I wholeheartedly and without reservation can affirm a statement of faith which includes a phrase like “eternal punishment” while also holding to conditional immortality. I not only believe this is possible, I believe it is the position which is most true to the Bible’s teaching and language. For a (hopefully) clear and concise picture of some of the key Biblical evidence for Conditional Immortality using graphics of verses, some readers may want to see my blog post (previously posted on RH Facebook page) here:

  2. TLY says:

    Peter, you said, “Whereas the concept of death speaks of a forfeit of life…”


    The concept of death, to the traditionalist, speaks of a forfeiture of all that is worthwhile while remaining is a state of existence. Death is not defined, to them, in terms of life as the conditionalist sees “life”. So although technically the conditionalist is able to affirm a Christian statement of faith that includes the language of eternal separation (because both believe a departure from God occurs), ultimately the two groups are each talking about two different things which are irreconcilable because of what it means to each of them to die (or to live!).

    When you say, “Proponents of conditionalism are therefore able to affirm any Christian statement of faith to include the language of eternal separation…,” I’m not sure what type of Christian statements you are referring to, but let’s take the most basic and often the starting point of the traditionalist. They will say:

    “To die a spiritual death means to be eternally separated from God; therefore, death means eternal separation from God.”

    I can’t agree with this traditionalist statement of faith that includes the language of eternal separation. While trying to find a point of affirmation, I think you are ignoring the fact that when the traditionalist uses the phrase “eternal separation” they also believe this to mean spiritual death.

    • Peter Grice says:

      Hi TLY. My article received feedback from some fellow contributors before publishing, and we do mention those definitions fairly often, so there’s probably not a lot we’re ignoring :)

      You start out speaking of a “Christian statement of faith that includes the language of eternal separation,” and end up giving a “traditionalist statement of faith that includes the language of eternal separation.”

      I wasn’t suggesting that conditionalists can affirm a *traditionalist* statement of faith. Clearly, if the statement itself (or for that matter, any accompanying documentation about the statement) defines the terms that way, then yes, that means that we cannot affirm it.

      But statements of faith are often crafted very carefully and deliberately, aiming to say no more nor less than is written. As the article notes, this is often deliberately inclusive. I’m referring of course to statements of faith that are formally written for purposes of qualifying membership or something along those lines. When framers want to be exclusive on some point, they tend to deliberately tighten up their language, because statements of faith are often used in a manner where they should speak for themselves, and either be affirmed or denied as such, in good conscience.

      My impression is that the word “death” does not typically feature in a statement of faith where the point being made speaks of “eternal separation.” I actually don’t think too many traditionalists would come up with your “spiritual death means to be eternally separated” wording. So much could be said at this point, but I’ll just suggest two reasons for that: traditionalists normally have in mind a handful of texts that make “spiritual death” the fallen condition of all people (so it’s not “eternal” by definition), and, therefore, traditionalists who are scrutinizing their view of a second death are likely to speak of eternal separation rather than any kind of spiritual death at this point. Also, on that scheme it would be the second spiritual death, which is hard to articulate without sounding incoherent, since a reader is being asked to countenance the notion that someone already dead can be said to then go on to die again, in exactly the same sense. It’s also not uncommon in general discourse for traditionalists to forget that they should account for a second death, and so the concept of eternal separation tends to be aimed at accounting for something else at that point (probably location and misery).

      In any case, I’m again not advocating the signing of a statement of faith that is known to be a “traditionalist” one in terms of the intent of a particular wording. But insofar as a statement of faith is itself meant to serve as an authoritative reference with respect to its own wording, for signing in good conscience, then the point I wish to make is just that a conditionalist can indeed affirm the phrase “eternal separation.” I know of real-world situations in which either that phrase was intended to be inclusive of conditionalism (as the article mentions), or else it was not intended to exclude conditionalism. Another possible scenario is that nobody in authority knows whether or not there was any clear intention with the phrase when the statement was first crafted, and as such are content to let the inherent openness of the language stand.

      • Peter Grice says:

        In fact this article would serve well those who are involved with crafting a formal statement of faith, should they wish to consider whether or not to allow for conditional immortality in their document, and then how best to articulate their intention either way.

      • TLY says:

        Peter, thanks for that clarification and you are right in that I was not properly separating and giving distance between a tightly worded or formal statement of faith and what is generally believed to be the meaning behind the words used. I guess I’ve never seen a statement of faith that includes the language of “eternal separation.” I’m used to something like this:

        southeastchristian(dot)org/beliefs/ (unable to link)

        Do you have an example statement of faith that illustrates what you are talking about?

        And regarding traditionalist definition of “death,” maybe I get that from Robert A. Peterson (Hell on Trial, pg. 198) where he defines “death” as the perpetual separation from God’s eternal life when referring to the second death. I have to admit I do not understand what a “spiritual death” means, but that doesn’t really matter, and substituting “second death” for “spiritual death” better illustrates the point I was trying to make.

        • Peter Grice says:

          Thanks, TLY. I don’t have any examples at hand, but the Southeast Christian SoF is instructive as an example of a minimalist approach: in their case, so minimalist that they leave the matter entirely open, saying no more than that apart from Jesus, we are all “lost and without hope.” I quite like that as a starting point, because it both prompts the question of the biblical hope (resurrection unto eternal life), and prompts a certain resonance with a person’s own appreciation of their lostness and hopelessness (which, if it incorporates the notion of death as an enemy to be feared, is likewise biblical; eg. Heb 2:15). I was trying to think how their statement might be affected by speaking of an “eternal separation,” but really, there is no biblical impetus to do this, since it is not biblical language (though the NIV tries to smuggle the concept into 2 Thess 1:9).

          Yes, you’re right, Peterson and others will still tend to define “death” as a perpetual separation, despite the incoherence I noted of becoming twice-separated at a second death. Calling something “spiritual” covers a multitude of logical sins, I’ve found. I think what is normally meant by that in this context is relational, so that the baseline concept of separation refers to the separation of God and individuals relationally (hence, Adam and Eve hid from God, and hence “severance” of the relationship is a similar idea). When a conditionalist sees that this should include the fact that God is the source of our lives (and not only positive qualities of our life-experience, such as “bliss”), it fits rather well.

          It can be hard to follow the traditionalist usages of the concept of death as separation. A so-called “physical death” can be another application of separation, this time of soul and body. That version of “death means separation” has been part of a tendency to forget the return to life at the time of resurrection, and to imagine that hell’s torments are non-physical, occurring to disembodied souls, even as soon as you die, before judgment day (another point of potential incoherence). Since the Bible has this persistent habit of just referring to death, the traditionalist has the unenviable task of selecting which version of death to assume each time, and to remind themselves of what is being separated from what, exactly.

          • Peter Grice says:

            It might be worth mentioning that the traditionalist understanding of death as separation doesn’t necessarily cohere with the traditionalist understanding of perishing/destruction as mere ruin or lostness. If both are taken to refer to what happens to a person, it can get a bit confusing to figure out what is being separated from what in order that a person should “die” yet remain alive. So it’s easier to either keep both sets of references abstract, referring to the God-person relation (which is a bit more accommodating), or to have only the perishing references refer to the person.

          • TLY says:

            Peter, I understand that the language of “eternal separation” allows for both views on one hand, but on the other hand a statement of faith is a tight and precise summary of essential belief. I’m having great difficulty seeing how “eternal separation” would be worked into a statement of faith that communicates essential and core beliefs of the members, but then that statement be accommodating to two conflicting beliefs. Doesn’t “eternal separation” in that context become nonspecific (too general) and not qualified to be part of a statement that is precise and essential? I’m still puzzled here.

            I’m not sure it’s possible to represent two views and have it also be essential, unless the belief is that it’s essential to believe in the possibility of the two conflicting beliefs, which would be an odd core expression of faith.

            I just don’t think too many groups would require as essential two possible views, or a statement that allows for both. Seems like they would go one way or the other, or exclude such a thing from a statement of faith and into nonessential beliefs. But if this can be done in a meaningful way, I’d like to see it.

          • TLY says:

            World Evangelical Alliance: “The Resurrection of both the saved and the lost; they that are saved unto the resurrection of life, they that are lost unto the resurrection of damnation.”

            Evangelical Alliance: “The personal and visible return of Jesus Christ to fulfil the purposes of God, who will raise all people to judgement, bring eternal life to the redeemed and eternal condemnation to the lost, and establish a new heaven and new earth.”

            After following your two links, I can see where “resurrection of damnation” and “eternal condemnation” (and “eternal separation”) might all be language deliberately selected to be inclusive of conditionalism and all forms of eternal torment.

            Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t like accommodations for two drastically different beliefs when specifying essential beliefs. Perhaps others see it as not that big of a deal.

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            Consider what you’re uncomfortable with here:

            “accommodations for two drastically different beliefs” “when specifying essential beliefs”

            Your discomfort is because you’re missing the difference between nonessential and essential beliefs. One of the points debated and voted on in the process of building those large Evangelical confessions was whether conditionalism was against the essentials of evangelical Christian faith. This was no accident; although the vote was close, it was in favor of not excluding conditionalism.

          • Peter Grice says:

            TLY, just chiming in to say I tend to agree with William’s note about essential and non-essential beliefs—but I personally appreciate your discomfort if you didn’t think this is a second-tier matter. Perhaps you’re familiar with the whole bounded set vs. centered set discussion in church circles (also in terms of the analogy to a fence vs. a watering hole), as well as similar issues in terms of the differences in how tightly or loosely we hold our beliefs. Suffice to say there are different models and purposes for how to use a formal statement of faith, ranging from exclusive stringency with clear denials, to inclusive common-ground affirmations, with degrees of openness. It is far too simplistic to say that this is the USA vs. UK in a nutshell, but there is a grain of truth to that overall contrast. What helps me ultimately settle on a good approach is to consider that we belong to the church universal, and our movement, evangelicalism, is very much a global one. Local church communities and more parochial institutions can validly require more exclusive particular commitments, but at the same time I would hope that they don’t go so far as to fail to accommodate the broader Body of Christ in some way.

          • TLY says:

            William and Peter, thanks for your comments.

            On one hand I can certainly appreciate the non-specific inclusion of conditional immortality and annihilationism within a statement of belief and it does feel good to be included and validated under “eternal separation” or similar language, but on the other hand just knowing that statement of belief is written to (primarily) include forms of eternal conscious torment produces a rather offensive and repulsive thought within me about the God I love.

            It’s a sometimes difficult dynamic for me—to desire (watering hole) harmony and be accommodating and allowing for disagreement with seemingly secondary matters, but then be deeply offended (fenced off) by such a terrible thought (deception, accusation) as eternal conscious torment and not wanting to call this important matter insignificant.

            It would be like someone wanting me to affirm a statement that my earthly father was a disciplinarian, when they know I’m thinking in terms of grounding and taking away car keys and they are thinking in terms of caging up and cigarette burns (torture). No one would affirm such a statement that is intended to harmoniously allow these two views of punishment to be nonspecifically blended as discipline. That’s terribly offensive to my father.

            The labeling of torture as “discipline” to accommodate grounding of course can’t be affirmed. Similarly, the labeling of ECT as “eternal separation” (or damnation or condemnation) to accommodate annihilation presents difficulties for me to affirm.

            Oh well, perhaps the bottom line is that I shouldn’t project what damnation, condemnation, and separation means to others, and that the reality of what that all means is not crystal clear to anyone. Along those lines, if damnation paints at least two starkly different pictures that are considered secondary issues, then why include this in a listing of critical beliefs? I would vote to model the Apostles’ Creed and leave damnation out of a listing of core beliefs.

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            The apostle’s creed does include damnation, though: “and he will come to judge the living and the dead.” The result of judgment is damnation (in the sense it’s used in the KJV).
            I don’t see how we can simply escape this — although I’m inclined to agree with you that ideally we shouldn’t try to simply HIDE it, as has been done in the past.

          • TLY says:

            William, if the reference to that result of judgement is meant to communicate that there are two distinct possibilities—one of horrible existence and one of nonexistence—then I change my vote to just leave it out. Maybe something like what I referenced earlier:

            southeastchristian(dot)org/beliefs/ (unable to link)

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            That’s all we’re suggesting — leave out the points of difference.

            (That creed is defective, though; it doesn’t leave out the points of difference, but the entire concept of Christian hope.)

          • TLY says:

            Additionally, when you say that “we shouldn’t try to simply HIDE it,” what would UNHIDDEN look like in a statement of faith that can be affirmed?

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            It wouldn’t fit in the statement itself, but there should be some note alongside that the two differing beliefs are both accepted — much like most organizations accept both Calvinists and Arminians.

          • TLY says:

            William, that approach seems to conflict with what Peter just concluded in his article: “However, conditionalists are unable to affirm statements which include everlasting torment, or everlasting consciousness for the unsaved.”

            Perhaps he can clarify what he means here, but I take his statement to mean not only exclusive statements of everlasting torment, but also statements listing everlasting torment among other possibilities (even, as you would require, in a form detached or distanced from the primary statement of belief).

            Regarding what you describe as an after note of sorts, within my analogy, that could look like this:

            Statement of Belief: We believe your father to be a disciplinarian*.
            (*Some believe him to ground and take away car keys and others believe him to have a cage and administer cigarette burns; neither view is certain, yet both views are accepted as valid alternative beliefs.)

            So, the UNHIDDEN beliefs that are unpacked by an asterisk still present an insurmountable problem when trying to affirm a statement that attempts to find common ground between two conflicting beliefs.

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            You can’t be serious.

          • TLY says:

            Well, yes, I am serious. Maybe I misunderstand what you are talking about with a statement of faith allowing for both views when you say, “ideally we shouldn’t try to simply HIDE it, as has been done in the past…there should be some note alongside.” Could you write such a statement to clarify what you are talking about since you seem exasperated with what I just wrote?

            Also, when you said earlier that “That creed is defective, though; it doesn’t leave out the points of difference, but the entire concept of Christian hope.” Did you mean to say, “it not only leaves out the points of difference, but the entire concept of Christian hope.”? If so, then what more hope need there be than this statement: “That man, created by God, willfully sinned against God and is consequently lost and without hope apart from Jesus Christ.”

            I’m confused by what you write.

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            I totally understand anyone being confused by my writing, and I take all the responsibility for that confusion; and I’m sorry. I’ll try to fix it.

            I also should have said that you have the right to judge what beliefs are compatible with your own.

            What I can’t believe, though, is that you’d think Peter might be trying to teach what you just said he’s trying to teach — that conditionalism and traditionalism might be incompatible, literally impossible to include in the same statement of faith. YOU might believe that; but Peter’s arguments are simply unmistakable on the subject. You may not agree with him (and clearly you do not); but if you want to persuade you need to make arguments for what you believe, rather than quoting Peter as though we were even slightly ambiguous. Look up at his article and _try_ to find him rejecting Evangelical agreement with believers who happen to be persuaded of ECT.

          • Peter Grice says:

            // Perhaps he can clarify what he means here //

            I just meant the statement itself. If the statement itself includes any affirmation of everlasting torment or consciousness, conditionalists cannot accept this. In contrast, conditionalists and traditionalists alike can accept a wording that references eternal separation and/or eternal punishment.

            In case it helps, my brief comment in the article was meant to suggest only what conditionalists would or wouldn’t be logically bound by (as a consequence of the aforementioned tenets and terms of conditionalism). Conditionalists can certainly bring other considerations to bear when weighing whether to agree to a given statement of faith.

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            Peter, he’s interpreting “any statement” to mean any statement meaning that ECT might not be false. He gave the example of “statements listing everlasting torment among other possibilities.”

            So for example he’s asking whether you’re ruling out a statement of faith that says “we are united in believing in final judgment, although we are free to disagree whether that takes the form of eternal torment or final annihilation.” He thinks you’re ruling it out because it “includes any affirmation of everlasting torment.”

            My answer: no, of course not.

          • TLY says:

            Peter, yes, that does help. Sure—100% true—a statement like that would be completely valid from a logical standpoint. But “I find the concept [of ECT] intolerable and do not understand how people can live with it without either cauterizing their feelings or cracking under the strain.” (Stott)

            So, for me, a statement that is written to specifically allow for ECT (yet not explicitly stated) can’t be affirmed—even if logistics allow it to be—because the concept of ECT is intolerable.

            William, thank you for that example. I hadn’t considered such a wording, and have less of a problem with that over what I had written, yet I still tend to believe it fails to be a meaningful statement of faith for me. To illustrate, suppose your statement was modified to be “We are united in believing in final judgment, although we are free to disagree whether that takes the form of eternal torment, final annihilation, or ultimately lead to reconciliation.” Logically that’s a fine statement to agree with, but it’s not an adequate statement of faith, in my opinion, for any of the three differing beliefs although all three can affirm it.

            I do understand there is room here to each affirm different things, and a bigger group under a more inclusive statement has its advantages. Within that, your earlier point of a secondary issue is a valid one, if that be the case here.

            Phew! Maybe I have too much energy against the notion of ECT and should let it exist in peace! On the other hand, is there anything more terrible to communicate to people? Oh well, my dilemma, I suppose…

          • William Tanksley Jr says:

            Thank you for explaining, TLY… and for your energy in favor of conditional immortality.

          • Peter Grice says:

            Right, William. Something can be “included” either explicitly or implicitly. Explicitness should be unequivocal and exclusive, whereas implicitness may be open to multiple things. Typically, an evangelical statement of faith will contain some deliberate openness (for example, on the thorny issue of the timing of the millennial reign of Christ). They will do this not by listing out the acceptable options—at least not in the statement itself—but by reducing them to terminology acceptable to both. Sometimes this also requires minimalism (for example, “We affirm the millennial reign of Christ” just sidesteps the issue of timing altogether, while “We affirm the future return of Christ” skips the millennium itself). But whether it does or doesn’t, here the amillenialist is never being asked to find premillenialism acceptable. Rather, they are just being asked if their views accord with the particular language.

            I think that’s how Stott saw statements of faith functioning. His work in global evangelicalism related to statements of faith functioning very broadly. Despite saying “I find the concept [of ECT] intolerable,” Stott would have had no problem signing off on any statement that allowed both for his view and for that view.

            So yes, in my article I was of course speaking of what the statement explicitly says. Given that conditionalists reject universal immortality, we can sign off on “the language of eternal separation,” but not that of “everlasting torment, or everlasting consciousness for the unsaved.” But this does not mean we cannot affirm the language of eternal separation if it is intended to be open to non-conditionalists.

            I would also want to point out that “eternal separation” should not simply mean “eternal torment” to one loosely described as a traditionalist. Separationism, as we call it, is an extremely common view these days, partly due to the influence of C.S. Lewis who said that the doors of Hell are “locked from the inside” (people willingly separate themselves from God forever). A person may affirm that much and yet think that “eternal torment” is an abhorrent, unbiblical idea.

          • TLY says:

            Peter, I can’t decide within what you wrote whether or not you would affirm William’s example statement of faith. I know that “could one?” or “would you?” are two different questions possibly having different answers, but would you affirm William’s statement?
            If you would affirm his statement, would you affirm my modification of his statement that includes UR?
            If you wouldn’t affirm his statement (because of the explicit mention of ECT), would you affirm a non-explicit version like: “We are united in believing in final judgment.”?

            Perhaps the following statement of faith might best illustrate my difficulty in this complex implicit/explicit dynamic in expressing beliefs:

            • We affirm that one must be saved.•

            This statement can be affirmed by those believing salvation is through Jesus Christ alone, but it also can be affirmed by those believing in salvation through good works. But consider this within William’s example:

            •We affirm that one must be saved, although we are free to disagree whether this is through Christ alone or through being a decent enough person.•

            Of course, we now have a major problem here with the belief “We affirm that one must be saved” if it’s written in language meant to be inclusive of two divergent beliefs, even though it is a valid statement individually to the divergent beliefs.

            I do get it that logically when the conditionalist affirms a statement of faith of “eternal separation” that they are only agreeing to their particular belief, but I fail to see that in a practical sense how they are not also agreeing to the possibility of ECT. I suppose it’s fine to take that stance if that be the case (that either is a plausible belief), but isn’t this already being done just through the intent of the language used? I don’t see a way out of agreeing that’s it’s okay to have either belief (or any variation like Separationism) under such a statement, especially since that is the exact intent of the careful wording of the statement in the first place. By the very nature and intent of the language used, both Traditionalists and Conditionalists are yielding plausibility to their opposing views even without accepting them as valid.

            I’m trying to examine my difficulty here (which is not easy, and yours and William’s perspectives are helpful), but I’m thinking that it lies within the conflict of trying to blend nonessential beliefs in a statement that is essential, but I’m not sure. I do also want to acknowledge that my own thinking sometimes produces discrepancies within me where it doesn’t all fit…me, myself and I don’t always agree, lol.

            The return of Jesus is a good example, where the belief that he return be essential, but the millennial nature tied to that return be open to various beliefs. I haven’t even latched on to a millennial belief myself, because they all are too confusing to me. So, in that respect, I can simply affirm that Jesus will return and be good with it. The various beliefs in the millennial nature tied to that return doesn’t really matter to me, at least not currently. But it is different for me when I wholeheartedly reject—if I’m allowed to express how I truly feel—the vile, disgusting, abhorrent, intolerable and damaging nature of the lie of ECT (whoops, the tongue—fingertips—revealed the heart there!).

            I do appreciate the discussion and the opportunity to think through these things. Now if you say that I’m “cracking under the strain” of the concept of ECT, you might be on to something there!

          • Peter Grice says:

            TLY, you ask if I would personally affirm William’s example “we are united in believing in final judgment, although we are free to disagree whether that takes the form of eternal torment or final annihilation.”

            I certainly would, yes. Although eternal torment is explicitly mentioned, the real point to note is that it’s clearly not required of conditionalists. Usually that isn’t how a typical statement does things (as noted in my previous comment), but it’s fine as a hypothetical. I would have no additional reservations about affirming it if the context involves fellowship with believers in eternal torment, which is something I already routinely do, and which Rethinking Hell encourages.

            As an aside, in case this is read by any conditionalists who would not be inclined to agree with our counsel here, in my judgment some of the various early modern conditionalist groups broke away from “mainstream” believers in eternal torment with undue influence from apostatizing and prophetic fulfillment narratives. Separatism is sometimes necessary in the dynamics of Christian movements, but there remains a self-serving temptation to demonize outsiders, including fellow Christians who may even be in significant error. Our primary impulse should be toward building unity as much as possible, reformation and revival being ideally done from within, without schism (please note, I’m just speaking generally, with no person or group in mind).

            Anyway, you then ask if I would affirm a modified statement to include UR. In principle, yes. In practice, it depends on the context. I could, but am free to bring other considerations to bear. But that’s exactly the same as in the first case. As a conditionalist I necessarily deny both other views, but in the wording of the example I am just not being required to affirm those views.

            // I do get it that logically when the conditionalist affirms a statement of faith of “eternal separation” that they are only agreeing to their particular belief, but I fail to see that in a practical sense how they are not also agreeing to the possibility of ECT. //

            Principled openness, a.k.a. epistemic humility, a.k.a. human fallibility/finitude. I don’t think I’m wrong. In fact I’m sure that I’m right. Even so, I’m also convinced that I could be wrong about that: my belief-forming faculties are just not necessarily flawless. I could even be spectacularly wrong, about everything I hold dear—wretched man that I am! In practice, I’m not worried about that. But in principle, I acknowledge its truth and implications.

            So in that sense, yes, one is agreeing to the possibility of ECT, by virtue of the possibility of being wrong. I think this is good and healthy.

            But in another sense, no, one may vehemently object, as vehemently as can be practiced while still retaining principled openness (vehemence enough, one should think, to satisfy any genuine disciple).

            Much more could be said, for instance about the prelapsarian value of interpretation itself, or the way in which a church member participates in the corporate Body of Christ, whose singular head is Christ, such that diversities are reconciled in Christ by his Spirit, rather than this responsibility being saddled upon each member (an understanding which can obviously be wrongly exploited, but it should serve to show that certain realities constitute the actual unity, and not beliefs about those realities per se, and hence some openness at some appropriate point).

            // I’m trying to examine my difficulty here (which is not easy, and yours and William’s perspectives are helpful), but I’m thinking that it lies within the conflict of trying to blend nonessential beliefs in a statement that is essential, but I’m not sure. //

            It may help to see that a statement of faith is typically trying to capture what is essential for membership, not essential for salvation. Highly exclusive groups such as cults might not care for that distinction (so I noted in my article that such is “relatively rare”), but it is a very important one in the landscape of the global church. The distinction means that I *can* truly fellowship with those I believe are Christians, even if I think they are very wrong on non-essentials for salvation, and yet I don’t *have to,* since as it turns out, membership criteria can be more stringent or “essential” than criteria for salvation (and there are lots of good reasons for this). The caveat to this is that I have no such discretion about whether I am a member of the Body of Christ, in automatic spiritual fellowship with all other members.

          • TLY says:

            Peter, I so very much appreciate those comments and your insight, especially that on principled openness. It gives me much to think about beyond myself and caution to soften some sharp edges. Thank you.

    • Don Williams says:

      Is there “existence” outside the presence of God? How is that possible?

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